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Falling into the liquidity trap: Notes on the global economic crisis
by Thomas R. Michl
This paper examines the underlying structural imbalances leading up to the
Great Recession of 2007-2009 from the vantage point of Hyman Minsky’s
theory of the liquidity trap. The traditional approach to the liquidity trap
focuses on the zero interest rate boundary while Minsky’s theory focuses on
three conditions that make investment spending unresponsive to monetary
policy: low underlying ex post proﬁtability of capital, weak expectations
about future proﬁtability, and uncertainty about prospective yields. The pa-
per structures an empirical investigation of proﬁtability and accumulation
around these three factors. The Great Recession was preceded by an un-
balanced recovery in which residential investment led demand while business
ﬁxed investment was structurally weak, given the strong ex post proﬁtabil-
ity of capital and the low interest rate environment. It is hypothesized that
increased import penetration and concerns about the sustainability of prof-
itability eroded both expectations and conﬁdence about prospective yields.
The Great Recession appears in this and several other dimensions to be a
crisis of disproportionality.Today and presumably for the future the schedule of the marginal
eﬃciency of capital is, for a variety of reasons, much lower than
it was in the nineteenth century. The acuteness and the pecu-
liarity of our contemporary problem arises, therefore, out of the
possibility that the average rate of interest which will allow a rea-
sonable average level of employment is one so unacceptable to
wealth-owners that it cannot be readily established merely by ma-
nipulating the quantity of money. —John Maynard Keynes (1964
[1936], pp. 308-309)
There is the possibility . . . that after the rate of interest has
fallen to a certain level, liquidity-preference may become virtually
absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers cash to hold-
ing a debt which yields so low a rate of interest. In this event,
the monetary authority would have lost control over the rate of
interest. But whilst this limiting case might become practically im-
portant in the future, I know of no example of it hitherto. Indeed,
owing to the unwillingness of most monetary authorities to deal
boldly in debts of long term, there has not been much opportunity
for a test. —John Maynard Keynes (Op. cit., p. 207)
According to the Economist (2009) magazine, on January 8, 2009 the
oﬃcial policy rate set by the Bank of England reached the lowest level since
its founding in 1694. The U.S. Federal Reserve Board lowered its policy rate
to a range of zero to twenty-ﬁve basis points in December 2008. And both
the Bank of England and the Fed have initiated unprecedented programs of
buying long-term ﬁnancial instruments. The “test” to which Keynes refers
in the second epigraph has arrived, and whether this will be the limiting case
now generally known as a liquidity trap is sure to be the subject of academic
debate and discussion for years to come.
This paper attempts to provide some analytical and empirical perspective
on the ﬁnancial and economic crisis that began in the U.S. in late 2007
and that now envelops the global economic system. It proceeds from the
observation made by Keynes in the ﬁrst epigraph. The precondition for
descent into a liquidity trap lies in the real conditions that govern business
investment, and in particular, in the proﬁtability of capital (which is what
Keynes means by the marginal eﬃciency of capital). The ﬁnancial aspects of
the current crisis have gotten plenty of attention from writers better qualiﬁed
1than this one; the paper focusses more on the nexus of forces governing
proﬁtability, saving and investment on the grounds that they created the
conditions for the ﬁnancial crisis.
The ﬁrst part of the paper argues that Minsky provides a better plat-
form for understanding the liquidity trap than Hicks because he puts the
investment decision at the center of the analysis rather than liquidity prefer-
ence. His analysis isolates three main factors which could initiate a liquidity
trap: a decline in the underlying proﬁtability of capital itself, a decline in
expectations about future proﬁtability, and an increase in the uncertainty
with which those expectations are held. The second part of the paper uses
these three factors to structure an empirical investigation into proﬁtability
and accumulation. The particular form which the current crisis has taken—a
burst housing price bubble causing the collapse of the market for mortgage
backed securities–makes more sense when it is located within a larger histor-
ical context. To translate into Marxian terminology, the price of averting a
1970s-style proﬁtability crisis turns out to be the disproprortionality crisis of
the 2000s.
1 The liquidity trap: Keynes, Hicks, and Krug-
man
Keynes and his interpreter, Sir John Hicks (1937) are responsible for the
modern theory of the liquidity trap (although the second epigraphic quote
makes it clear that for Keynes this was merely an hypothesis whose empirical
testing, we might add, is only now under way). This is usually explained in
modern discussions as a pathology of the credit markets characterized by an
inability of the monetary authority to reduce the rate of interest below some
minimum.1 Since the monetary authorities control or regulate the very short-
term interest rate (strictly speaking, the overnight rate), that minimum is
generally taken to be the zero interest rate bound (ZRB). The oﬃcial policy
rate (OPR), however, is an economic variable that has virtually no inﬂuence
in itself over any economically relevant behavior, such as the consumer and
business investment spending that drives aggregate demand. Business in-
1Hicks represents the liquidity trap by an LM curve (showing the money market equi-
librium combinations of income and the interest rate) that has a horizontal region at low
levels of interest and income.
2vestment (capital accumulation) and household spending on housing (called
residential investment in the national income accounts) are sensitive to long-
term interest rates on bonds and mortgages. These are related to the OPR
through expectations of future short-term rates. In the expectations theory
of the term structure of interest rates, the long rate is simply the arithmetic
average of short rates expected to prevail until the long bond (or other credit
instrument) matures. This theory remains incomplete and has not been em-
pirically successful (Campbell, 1995) but because it is based on an arbitrage
condition that makes good sense, it does remain a useful starting point.
What Keynes, and Hicks, saw is that once the short rate has hit bottom,
there will be a strict limit on how low the long rates can go. In a world of
perfect certainty, of course, the long rate could approach zero if the monetary
authority committed itself to the ZRB for a suﬃciently long period. But
in the uncertain and turbulent world of really-existing capitalism, investors
worry about the capital loss on a long bond if the interest rate should go
up in the future. (Bond prices and their yields, or interest rates, move in
opposite directions by deﬁnition.) Once interest rates get close to zero, bond
prices can’t go any higher. But they can go down. So holding a bond with a
zero interest rate is like a one-way losing bet that no investor will consider.2
As a result, when the monetary authority gets down to the ZRB, the whole
complex of interest rates, representing diﬀerent maturity and risk classes of
credit, will likewise bottom out.
And this is exactly what has been observed in recent episodes that qualify
as possible liquidity traps. Even at the height of the zero interest rate policy
in Japan, from 2002-2005, the long-term rate never fell below one hundred
basis points. During this period, the short-term rate averaged only six basis
points, while the long-term rate averaged around 129 basis points, using data
from Eurostat’s AMECO data set for the 3-month and 10-year rates. This
123 basis point spread is not particularly low historically for Japan. Similarly,
the spread on constant maturity Treasuries (10-year versus 3-month) in the
U.S. averaged around 280 basis points from January to June in 2009 (when
the policy rate was hard against the ZRB), which is also not historically
atypical.3
2As Hicks puts it, “... the shortest short-term rate may perhaps be nearly zero. But
if so, the long-term rate must lie above it, for the long rate has to allow for the risk that
the short rate may rise during the currency of the loan, and it should be observed that
the short rate can only rise, it cannot fall”(Hicks, 1937, p.154).
3In Japan, Eurostat uses the yield on a seasoned 10-year government bond, not the
3It is at this point that Keynes’s suggestion engages: let the monetary au-
thority adopt a non-traditional policy of open market operations at the long
end of the yield curve. By actively buying long-term bonds, the authority
might be able to convince investors to discount the danger of capital losses
on their long bond holdings, and by doing so, bring the whole complex of
rates down to the levels that are required to achieve their employment ob-
jectives. Modern macroeconomists who have not abandoned the basic Key-
nesian framework, such as Paul Krugman or Gregory Mankiw, are divided
about the prospects of escaping from a liquidity trap through non-traditional
open market operations, with Krugman taking the traditional view that ﬁs-
cal policy represents the only reliable solution while Mankiw continues to
believe4 that more can still be achieved with monetary policy. (To be fair,
Mankiw does not advocate relying solely on monetary policy in practice, but
his conservative political views make the non-ﬁscal option attractive.) Roger
Farmer (2008) has even proposed that the Fed buy up equities in order to
revitalize the stock market.
Krugman’s skepticism about the ability of the Fed to move the whole
complex of interest rates reduces to the empirical observation that while the
Fed’s actions are large relative to the monetary base, “when the Fed tries to
support the credit market more broadly, by contrast, it’s doing something
private actors also do—which means that the credit it pumps into the system
may be partly oﬀset by private withdrawals—and it’s also trying to move a
much bigger beast, the $50 trillion or so credit market” (Krugman, 2009, p.
176). Even after an unprecedented expansion of its balance sheet over 2008,
the Fed, now with around $2.0 trillion in assets, is comparable in size to a
large bank holding company like Bank of America ($2.3 trillion), JPMorgan
Chase ($2.1), or Citigroup ($1.8).
Moreover, the Fed’s ability to compress the yield curve must be con-
strained as well by the overall Fed-Treasury (or Treasury-Fed) “plan” to re-
capitalize the banks, which now seems to involve letting them build up Tier 1
capital from retained earnings. As Epstein and Ferguson (1984) pointed out
with respect to the Depression-era Fed, and as Epstein (1995) subsequently
constant maturity rate that is imputed to 10-year bonds by the Fed. As a result, the
spreads in the U.S. and Japan are not strictly comparable.
4I have been unable to track down any instances in which Mankiw says this in print,
so I am relying on my memory of his verbal answer to my question on whether we have
entered a liquidity trap at the January 2009 “The Fed in the 21st Century” Conference
held at the New York Fed.
4formalized in an IS-LM model, any substantial decline in the interest rate
spread on longer term lending risks squeezing bank proﬁts on their deposit
and loan business. Even though banks today make a far smaller proportion
of earnings through the maturity transformation from short-term deposits
into long-term loans (about half the earnings of commercial banks are now
gained from fee income for various ﬁnancial services), this political economy
point remains salient.
Nor are constraints from the balance sheets of private ﬁnancial institu-
tions the Fed’s only worry; it also has its own net worth to consider. Non-
traditional open market operations in which the Fed acquires private assets
also require the Fed to take on risk that blurs the line between ﬁscal and
monetary policy. The Fed relies on the performance of its assets to cover
operating expenses, turning back any surplus to the Treasury. If it were to
experience losses, it would not face insolvency (as would a private bank) but
the need to draw on the ﬁscal powers of the state. And no Fed chairman
wants to go hat in hand to Congress. To preserve its ﬁscal independence, the
Fed must protect its equity. After over eighteen months of ﬁnancial crisis,
the Fed’s credit easing (sometimes called quantitative easing) policies to ad-
dress speciﬁc ﬁnancial problems have already weakened its balance sheet to
an unparalleled degree. Here is a thumbnail picture of the ﬁnancial position
of the Fed reconstructed5 from the Consolidated Statement of Condition for




Government securities 1151.5 Currency 871.3
Private claims 654.2 Reserves 726.3
Foreign reserves 129.5 Deposits 289.0
Total assets 1935.2 Total liabilities 1886.6
Net worth 48.6
Like all banks, the Fed is highly leveraged; its assets are over 40 times
5Foreign reserves includes modest gold holdings and fairly large swaps with foreign
central banks. Repos (a liability of $72 billion) have been subtracted from government
securities. Miscellaneous assets and liabilities have been swept into private claims and
deposits.
5equity. And its liability structure is unique, including currency and captive
deposits from the Treasury, most of which are now held as a sterilization
tool. But risk exposure from its large accumulation of private sector liabili-
ties (roughly one-third of its assets) through TAF loans and a menagerie of
new credit facilities must be a concern. For perspective, the Maiden Lane
LLC’s that hold the moldering remains of Bear Stearns and AIG total $62
billion. Roger Farmer’s proposal to buy common stocks is unlikely to reach
an enthusiastic reception at the FOMC.
This discussion has been predicated on the assumption that a particu-
larly low real rate of interest would be required to restore employment and
growth.6 The real rate of interest is the nominal rate minus the inﬂation
rate expected to prevail over the term of the credit instrument. It is the
real, not the nominal, rate of interest that is generally thought to be more
signiﬁcant regulator of investment spending and aggregate demand. The real
interest rate required to achieve high or “full” employment, called the natu-
ral rate of interest, might even become negative. In this case, the monetary
authority can only achieve the natural rate of interest if it can get traction
from widespread expectations of on-going inﬂation, and even then, only if the
expected inﬂation rate itself exceeds the natural rate of interest. (In other
words, the real rate of interest can only be brought down to zero minus the
expected inﬂation rate and no further.)
That is why the decline in inﬂation to zero and beyond is now widely
seen as such a danger. Deﬂation increases the likelihood of falling into a
liquidity trap, or, in this case, a deﬂation trap, as was dramatically shown by
Japan during its Lost Decade. The Japanese example played a key role in the
Great Recession. Fear of deﬂation led the Greenspan Fed to pursue unusually
low interest rates during the post 2001 recovery (by their own admission),
and this helped set up the imbalanced growth that culminated in the Great
Recession, as we see below.
On the other hand, the ability of higher inﬂation expectations to bring
down the real rate of interest even if monetary policy is hard against the ZRB
opens the door to yet another monetary solution to a liquidity trap: increase
inﬂation expectations. While this was the main policy advice oﬀered by Paul
Krugman for Japan during its Lost Decade, he has so far been unwilling (on
6In more technical terms, the assumption is that the IS curve, which shows product
or goods market equilibrium combinations of income and the interest rate, is positioned
so that the achievement of “full employment” requires an interest rate that lies below the
ZRB.
6his blog) to publicly advocate a similar response from the Fed.7 The central
bank could, in fact, adopt a public, explicit inﬂation target that exceeds its
current implicit target8 and cash in on its hard-won credibility to inﬂuence
expectations. Given its political conservatism, even Krugman has evidently
decided that eﬀorts to persuade the FOMC to adopt such a sensible policy
would be pointless.
Thus, we see that monetary policy could in principle be pushed to do
more to combat a liquidity trap that arises from a pathologically low natural
rate of interest, but numerous constraints, as much political as economic,
stand in the way. A deeper question, well beyond the scope of this paper, is
whether ﬁnancial innovation has made the focus on the term structure more
or less irrelevant in a world of securitization, structured ﬁnance, and ﬁnancial
layering; see Mehrling (2009). The interesting question within our scope is
adumbrated in the ﬁrst epigraph from Keynes: how could this pathological
state of aﬀairs arise? For this we turn to Minsky.9
2 The liquidity trap: Minsky
In this connection, Hyman Minsky’s (1975) masterly exposition of Keynesian
macroeconomics provides a revealing vantage point that calls into question
the conventional obsession with the ZRB.
7Unfortunately, public discussion of using monetary policy to achieve negative real
interest rates has been mainly conﬁned to Gregory Mankiw’s resurrection (on his blog at
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com and in his New York Times column) of Silvio Gesell’s
time-stamped money scheme, at best an academic exercise.
8The FOMC began publishing a survey of its members in January 2009, the central
tendency of which is generally thought to represent its implicit inﬂation target of just
below 2% per year.
9There are some hypotheses about Japan that do not involve proﬁtability directly.
Krugman’s celebrated Brookings Paper (Krugman, 1998) presents what he elsewhere calls
a “buttoned-down” model of intertemporal choice in which a demographic shock makes
high saving optimal today, and drives the natural rate of interest below zero. As in many
New Keynesian models, there is no investment (to be fair, Krugman does brieﬂy consider
it), which both raises the question of what can be learned from these models about capital
accumulation and why anyone would want to call these models “Keynesian” given the
central role investment plays in the General Theory. Nakatani and Skott (2007) argue
that Japan represents in eﬀect a classic Harrodian trap, driven by the demographic shock
of running out of surplus labor in the 1980s. Harrod (1942), recall, argued that when the
natural rate of growth falls below the warranted rate it paradoxically ushers in secular
stagnation because it tends to draw the actual rate below the warranted rate.
7Minsky proceeds from a disagreement with Keynes over the best expo-
sitional strategy for the theory of investment. As is well known, Keynes’s
theory takes as given the state of long-term expectations about the future
prospective yields of capital investment. These yields, which we can call
Qt, represent a series of cash ﬂows or proﬁts anticipated to arise at future
dates, t, from an investment in a representative asset in the capital stock.
Given these yields, and given a known supply price for the capital asset,
there arises a discount rate that equates the discounted value of the yields
to the supply price that Keynes calls the “marginal eﬃciency of capital.” He
then asserts that increased levels of investment in a particular type of capital
will typically reduce the marginal eﬃciency, both by making that type more
abundant and lowering its yields and by making it more costly to produce,
thus raising its supply price. This leads him to believe that by aggregating
over all the capital assets, we can obtain a downward sloping schedule of the
overall marginal eﬃciency. It is then a short step to the textbook investment-
demand schedule, by which the level of investment spending will be pushed
out until “the marginal eﬃciency of capital in general is equal to the market
rate of interest.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 137).
Minsky’s quibble with this (now standard) treatment is that it conﬂates
the interest rate with the discount rate that entrepreneurs actually apply to
prospective yields in order to arrive at an estimation of the economic value
of the capital assets. “This choice of construct by Keynes led to an undue
emphasis upon the interest rate, which to Keynes was always an attribute
of money loans, as the tune caller . . . ”(Minsky, 1975, p. 99). It led,
Minsky argues, to an underappreciation of the full role of uncertainty in the
investment decision itself.
Minsky’s alternative exposition starts by recognizing the central role of es-
timations of the value of the capital asset, as the discounted value of expected
yields, using a discount rate that is generally greater than the monetary rate
of interest because of the sacriﬁce of liquidity involved in committing to a
physical asset having limited marketability (compared to a ﬁnancial instru-
ment that earns the monetary rate of interest).10 While Minsky refers to this
10Formally, Minsky’s entrepreneur calculates the value of the capital asset, which we can
write (suppressing time subscripts) as PK = Σ(δQ), where δ are the dated capitalization
factors, 1/(1 + i + η)t, i is the monetary interest rate, and η is the uncertainty premium.
Minsky’s exposition focusses on the capitalization factor, and I’ve taken the liberty of
translating that analysis into the corresponding discounting rate, i + η. Notice also that
I’m ignoring the issue of the cost of equity capital, which plays a central role in the
8estimated value as the “price” of capital assets, it is not a market price in
the ordinary sense of the term but rather a subjective valuation or (to misuse
economics jargon) “shadow” price that facilitates the investment decision.
At some risk of oversimplifying, think of the capital asset as a stan-
dardized unit of physical capital, say a fully equipped fast food restaurant.
The proﬁt revenues from a typical McDonald’s are fairly predictable; the
shadow price of the restaurant will be the capitalized value of these prospec-
tive yields, using for discounting purposes the monetary rate of interest plus
a premium that captures the sacriﬁce of liquidity. The premium over the
monetary rate of interest measures the degree of uncertainty perceived by
investors/entrepreneurs. (NB: most investment decisions do not generate
prospective yields that are nearly as predictable as a franchise restaurant. In
Taleb’s terminology, they are from Extremistan, not Mediocristan.)
In Minsky’s treatment, the level of investment will be regulated by dif-
ferences between the supply price of capital assets and these estimates of the
value of the capital assets. When the supply price (at which the asset can
be purchased from another capitalist ﬁrm, or the cost of building a franchise
restaurant in our example) is less than the estimated value of the asset, it
clearly makes good sense for an entrepreneur to purchase the asset, or, in
other words, to invest, as long as ready funding from internal proﬁts or ex-
ternal sources is available. He champions this expositional and analytical
strategy because, among other things, “the capitalization factor, which can
have a varying ratio to the market rate of interest on secure loans because of
the diﬀerent values placed upon liquidity, is explicitly considered” (1975, p.
100).
Under normal circumstances, there is little diﬀerence between the two
expositions. A stimulative monetary policy will lower the monetary rate of
interest. In Keynes’s account, this will make it economic to invest in more
projects that support a lower marginal eﬃciency of capital. In Minsky’s
account, the lower monetary rate will increase the discounted value of future
yields and make economic the purchase of more capital assets of given supply-
price.
But in a liquidity trap, the estimated value of the capital assets falls below
the supply-price of new capital goods, making investment in real capital
uneconomic. This will be the state of aﬀairs during and immediately after
a ﬁnancial crisis in which the level of uncertainty rises, causing such a rush
neoclassical and q-theories of investment.
9to liquidity and rise in the uncertainty premium applied by entrepreneurs to
the discounting of future yields (Q’s) that, as Minsky observes, “even if the
interest rate on ﬁnancial assets continues to fall as the supply of money is
increased, the capitalization rate applied to investment assets may not rise
by enough to induce investment” (1975, p. 116). In this, monetary policy
will quite possibly be rendered impotent even before it reaches the ZRB, for
the inability to aﬀect the interest rate is not the diﬀerentia speciﬁca of a
Minskian liquidity trap.11
Of course, to achieve a full degree of monetary policy ineﬀectiveness,
Minsky’s analysis does require that there is some boundary condition on the
shadow price of capital assets.12 Without this boundary, at some point, even
with a very high uncertainty premium, the monetary authority should be
able to reduce the interest rate enough to make the purchase of new capital
assets economic once again. In this case, the liquidity trap described above
is a local singularity that can be escaped after a large, discrete reduction in
the policy rate. Only if there is a lower bound on the interest rate will it be
possible for the maximum value of capital assets to fall short of the supply-
price of capital assets, insuring a global or true liquidity trap that cannot be
escaped by monetary means alone.
Now we can see that the debate over whether the monetary authorities
have any powder left once they hit the ZRB misses the point. In the liquidity
trap that Minsky describes, non-traditional monetary policies may have little
immediate eﬀect on aggregate demand if they are incremental and tentative.
In the best-case scenario, this is a local trap that can be escaped, but only if
the authorities are willing to take bold actions that induce large and discrete
movements in the relevant long-term interest rates. Of course, in practice
we will never know what kind of singularity the US and world economy have
encountered because (fortunately) the application of healthy doses of ﬁscal
stimulus confounds the controlled experiment that would be required for a
fair test.
11Another way of putting this is that in a Minskian liquidity trap, the IS curve becomes
vertical over a broad range, so that even if the monetary authority can push down the (non-
horizontal) LM curve, it does no good. By contrast, the conventional Hicksian treatment
deﬁnes the liquidity trap by a horizontal LM curve, coupled with a typically non-vertical
IS curve. Of course, both accounts assume that the IS curve is ill-positioned in the sense
that achieving the natural rate of interest is problematic.
12See Minsky’s (1975, Cf. p. 87 or pp. 102-103) derivation of the function describing
PK, where he explicitly assumes that some boundary does exist.
10The Minskian approach to investment and accumulation clariﬁes greatly
the relationship between the proﬁtability of capital and the liquidity trap.
We can follow Taylor and O’Connell (1985) to see the connection. They
observe that in a simpliﬁed model, the stream of expected future proﬁts, or
prospective yields in Keynes’s terminology, can be written as the arithmetic
product of the expected proﬁt rate times the average price level. The ex-
pected proﬁt rate, in turn, can be conceived as the actual or ex post proﬁt
rate plus an expectational “correction” that can either be positive (proﬁts
are expected to rise) or negative (fall).13 Taylor and O’Connell ignore the
distinction so beloved by Minsky between the monetary interest rate and the
actual discount rate deployed by entrepreneurs (reﬂective of the uncertainty
premium) in order to focus on the role of changes in expectations of future
proﬁts, as reﬂected in the expectational correction factor. But by combining
these two expositional approaches, we can readily enumerate the three fac-
tors that can spring a liquidity trap by reducing the value of assets in the
capital stock below their supply-price:
• An increase in the uncertainty premium in the discount rate used by
capitalists, signifying a strengthened desire for liquidity.
• A decline in the expectational correction factor, signifying pessimism
about future proﬁtability.
• A decline in the observed rate of proﬁt that forms the basis for projec-
tions of future proﬁts.
The ﬁrst item we have already discussed, and this surely plays the major
role at the moment of crisis. The second item can also pull the economy
into a liquidity trap, or at least increase its vulnerability to entrapment, if
entrepreneurs become discouraged by a conviction that the future will not
be as favorable to business proﬁts as the present. These two factors are in
13Thus, the prospective yields for an asset in the capital stock are given by Q = (r+)P,
where r represents the net proﬁt rate and  represents the expectational correction factor,
and P represents the price of a unit of output. The estimated value of capital assets will be
given by Σ(δQ) as before. The simplifying assumption is that the price of capital goods is
no diﬀerent than the price of other goods, so that one index covers them all. In this case,
investment in a new asset makes economic sense whenever PK > P, and the aggregate
rate of investment will be regulated by the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁt rate and
the discount rate, (i + η), together with ﬁnancial conditions described by borrower’s and
lender’s risk.
11principle hard to disentangle, and in Keynes’s analysis both are subsumed
under the notion of “animal spirits.” Lack of faith in future business condi-
tions is likely to accompany a heightened sense of uncertainty and insecurity
that can only be paciﬁed by cold, hard cash. The ﬁnal item represents the
factor that Keynes has identiﬁed in the epigraph as the source of the “acute-
ness and the peculiarity of our contemporary problem,” for when he makes
historical comparisons of the marginal eﬃciency of capital, as in the famous
ﬁnal chapter of the General Theory, it is well known that he refers to the
proﬁtability of capital.14 A low proﬁt rate predisposes a capitalist economy
to ﬁnancial crisis. All three items have arguably contributed to the Great
Recession of the Naughties.
3 Proﬁtability
Serious research on the proﬁtability of capital dates back to the 1970s, and
since that time, heterodox, chieﬂy Marxian-inﬂuenced economists and histo-
rians have continued to track and analyze the movements in various measures
of proﬁtability.15 Two recent treatises on the nature of modern capitalism
(Brenner, 2002; Dum´ enil and L´ evy, 2004a) make the sharp decline in the
rate of proﬁt during the 1970s that is readily observable in the data pre-
sented below in Table 1 central to their somewhat divergent analytic nar-
ratives. In short, Brenner cleaves to an essentially neo-Smithian theory in
which competition from newly industrialized countries puts downward pres-
sure on mark-ups and burdens advanced capitalist economies with excess
capital stock and declining proﬁtability. Dumenil and Levy, by contrast, ad-
here to the traditional Marxian view that the bias of capitalist technology
toward ever rising ﬁxed capital requirements per unit of output, which they
call technical change a l` a Marx, can (but not must) put downward pres-
sure on proﬁtability for signiﬁcant periods. Brenner criticizes this viewpoint
for its Malthusian ﬂavor: “Were this theory correct, what would logically
be entailed is the impeccable Malthusian proposition that the rate of proﬁt
can be expected to fall because, as a direct result of capital accumulation,
14Keynes subscribed to the marginalist theory that the rate of proﬁt was a measure of
the scarcity of capital, subject to the law of diminishing returns. The accumulation of
capital, he believed, would depress the rate of proﬁt by making capital more abundant.
15For a survey of some of this literature and broader discussion of the continuing im-
portance of proﬁtability as a regulator or capital accumulation, see Glyn (1997).
12overall productivity—productivity taking in to account both labor and capital
inputs—can be expected to decline” (2002, p. 14). Despite these disagree-
ments, both authors proceed from the premise that the 1970s was a crisis of
proﬁtability, and that the subsequent period from 1980 or so to the present
(which conventional economists now call the Great Moderation) represents
a protracted response to this period of turbulence.
A simple but useful historical periodization that will structure this dis-
cussion, making very loose estimates of the beginning and ending dates, is
the following:
• 1945-1970: Golden Age of Capital Accumulation
• 1970-1982: Proﬁtability Crisis
• 1982-2001: Great Moderation (includes 1990s New Economy)
• 2001-20??: Run-up and Great Recession
At the risk of committing Malthusian errors, I regard the classical-Marxian
theory of growth as a reasonably good analytical framework for organizing
a narrative around this periodization. The Marxian theory marshals the hy-
pothesis of biased technical change and regards class conﬂict as central to
understanding the distribution of income. Technical change can play a sup-
porting or retarding role in the accumulation process, depending on whether
it is capital-saving or capital-using. For example, a labor-saving and capital-
using pattern, sometimes called Marx-biased technical change, represents a
kind of secular (negative) technology shock that will erode proﬁtability when
workers are able to capture, as they almost always are, a suﬃcient share of
the gains in output per worker that result from the technical improvements.
Thus, the Marxian theory requires a ﬂexible approach that emphasizes the
mutually reinforcing roles of technical change, accumulation, and conﬂict
over the distribution of income mediated by the reserve army of labor and
by political, social or institutional forces.
As macroeconomic data sets have improved their coverage across coun-
tries and time, evidence of biased technical change has grown. The history
of developed capitalist economies like the U.S. supports the view that both
unfavorable (capital-using) and favorable (capital-saving) technology shocks
have been observed, and that no clear secular trend has emerged over, say,
13Table 1: Nonﬁnancial and Total Corporate Proﬁt Rates and Factors,
Selected Years 1960-2007
Broad capital Narrow capital
Year π ∆π r ∆r ρ ∆ρ r ∆r ρ ∆ρ r#
1951 23.14 15.39 66.51 15.94
1955 22.11 -1.03 14.48 -0.91 66.52 -0.99 15.28
1965 22.43 +0.32 12.58 56.08 16.74 +2.26 74.63 +8.11 17.24
1972 17.22 -5.21 9.04 -3.53 52.54 -3.53 11.66 -5.07 67.74 -6.88 12.38
1977 17.73 +0.51 8.19 -0.85 46.21 -6.33 10.53 -1.13 59.40 -8.34 11.29
1988 17.80 +0.07 8.78 +0.59 49.34 +3.13 11.20 +0.67 62.93 +3.53 11.60
1997 18.71 +0.90 9.72 +0.93 51.96 +2.61 12.21 +1.00 65.28 +2.34 13.06
2006 19.38 +0.67 9.51 -0.20 49.09 -2.86 11.80 -0.41 60.89 -4.38 13.69
Notes: # includes ﬁnancial corporate. Years chosen are prominent peak years for the proﬁt
rate, and ∆x represents the change in a variable since the last peak year. π represents
the share of net operating surplus in net domestic product originating in the nonﬁnancial
corporate sector. ρ represents the net output-net capital ratio. r is the net proﬁt rate,
= πρ. Broad capital is reproducible ﬁxed assets plus inventories plus cash. Narrow capital
is reproducible ﬁxed assets.
14the last century.16 Indeed, the most prominent technology shock was perhaps
the favorable increase in capital productivity (i.e., the output-capital ratio)
around WWII that has been called the Great Leap Forward by Dum´ enil et
al. (1993). But contrary to Brenner, the Marxian approach does recognize
the technologically progressive nature of capitalism (it is not Malthusian or
Ricardian). Under biased technical change, the productivity “taking into
account both labor and capital inputs” to which Brenner refers simply can-
not be deﬁned, and in fact, what he is unwittingly invoking is a neoclassical
doctrine — total factor productivity — that is dependent upon the marginal
productivity theory of distribution that it was invented to rescue from em-
pirical irrelevance.17
The data presented in Table 1 show proﬁt rate peaks, a practical way of
handling the procyclical nature of the proﬁt rate. The net proﬁt rate is by
deﬁnition the product of the proﬁt share in net value added and the ratio of
value added to the capital stock employed, which is conveniently called capi-
tal productivity.18 The table shows the levels and changes in all three of these
variables using both a broad and narrow deﬁnition of the capital stock. As
is customary, the proﬁt rate is measured before tax, and proﬁt is conceived
broadly to include property income, including net interest and rents (though
these are small); the national income category is net operating surplus. This
proﬁt rate represents a broad measure of the maximum rate of expansion of
capital (which occurs with total reinvestment of surplus), abstracting from
taxes, corporate ﬁnancial policy, and other concrete mediating factors. De-
spite the high level of abstraction, this measure is believed to convey useful
information about the constraints and determinants of economic growth.
The data using the broad deﬁnition of capital in Table 1 begin with the
ﬁrst available peak in the underlying data set, the SNA-NIPA experimental
program of the BEA that eﬀectively updates and systemizes the pathbreak-
ing work of Richard and Nancy Ruggles (1970) on sectoral national income
16Developing countries, on the other hand, almost universally exhibit Marx-biased tech-
nical change until they reach some threshold level of industrial development.
17See Foley and Michl (1999) for a theory of production and distribution in the clas-
sical/Marxian tradition under biased technical change that can provide an alternative to
the neoclassical marginal productivity approach. We show that total factor productivity is
essentially an accounting device that makes the observed marginal product of labor equal
to the wage by deﬁnition.
18In other words, the rate of proﬁt is deﬁned by r = πρ where π and ρ represent the
proﬁt share in net value added and the ratio of net value added to capital stock.
15accounts with stock-ﬂow consistency and that oﬀers the signal advantage of
providing one-stop shopping for all the relevant stock and ﬂow items needed
for a serious analysis. The lack of data pre-1960 is a minor drawback. The
broad deﬁnition of capital comprises ﬁxed reproducible assets (structures and
equipment), inventories, and cash holdings at the end of the period. This
is probably the closest operational deﬁnition to “the” Marxian rate of proﬁt
at this level of abstraction. The narrow deﬁnition strips out inventories and
cash, and this is the most commonly used methodology.19 Secular changes in
inventory management (i.e., just-in-time) and ﬁnancial innovation make the
broad deﬁnition worth the extra eﬀort needed, and there are indeed some
minor diﬀerences visible between the two accounting systems.
The most conceptually clean time series data available cover the non-
ﬁnancial corporate sector but this aggregate suﬀers from a boundary problem
since the non-ﬁnancial corporations are classiﬁed according to their principle
activity, which lumps considerable ﬁnancial activities such as GE Capital and
GMAC in with the non-ﬁnancial sector. Especially in view of the growing
“ﬁnancialization” of the US economy, manifest in the rising share of corporate
proﬁts captured by the ﬁnancial sector, the table includes, as a memo item,
the rate of proﬁt calculated on the narrow capital deﬁnition for the corporate
sector as whole (for which more historical data are available than the broad
deﬁnition). This measure is not wholly satisfactory because the ﬁnancial
corporations, commercial banks, bank holding companies, institutions (like
Prince) formerly know as investment banks, mutual funds, and others do not
produce a well-deﬁned commodity product and do not deploy ﬁxed capital
assets in the same way as a commodity-producing business enterprise.
Yet another set of problems arises in the deﬁnition of proﬁt. Like most
researchers, I calculate the net rate of proﬁt using the net operating surplus
consisting of proﬁts before tax (with adjustments for the eﬀects of inﬂation
and taxes on inventories and on depreciation allowances) plus net interest
originating in the non-ﬁnancial sector.20 The BEA follows the convention of
19Some writers use ﬁnancial net worth in the denominator of the rate of proﬁt, a practice
that I ﬁnd unappealing at this level of abstraction because it conﬂates the underlying
proﬁtability of capitalist production with the ﬁnancing of capitalist business enterprises.
But return to stockholder equity does have a place in the analysis of leverage.
20Because the before-tax proﬁt rate measures the maximum rate of expansion of capital,
it is widely regarded as an appropriate metric at this level of abstraction, but some authors
prefer the after-tax rate. One problem that is rarely acknowledged is that deducting only
the corporate tax from before-tax proﬁt misses the fact that capitalists also pay substantial
16treating all salary-type income, including the compensation of top executives,
as labor cost. While this may not have mattered much in the 1960s or 1970s,
the explosion in average CEO compensation (it increased by a factor of 200!)
since then calls this methodology into question if we adopt the Marxian
viewpoint that managers are eﬀectively performing the function of capitalist
owners, regardless of their formal-legal status, and that their compensation
at least partly represents a distribution of surplus value. The rise in executive
pay should reﬂect itself in a rising share of proﬁts in value added, but data
limitations prevent further action.21 On the other hand, a good argument
can and has been made (Dum´ enil and L´ evy, 2004b) that the recovery of
capitalist income has taken the form of increased salaries for top groups
rather than increased property income and that this reﬂects the distinctive
political economy of neoliberalism. At a higher level of abstraction, it would
clearly be useful to interrogate the data about the limits on accumulation
imposed by an even broader deﬁnition of the rate of proﬁt.22
The narrative emerging from Table 1 starts from the evident collapse of
proﬁtability in the 1970s. It is clear that this decline can be attributed,
in a purely accounting sense, to both a declining proﬁt share and declining
capital productivity. Most of the literature on this period blames the declin-
ing proﬁt share on a combination of rising real wages (equivalently declining
mark-ups over unit labor cost) and rising prices for raw materials, particu-
larly petroleum, produced outside the domestic corporate sector. At least
some of the decline in capital productivity reﬂects lower utilization of capital
stocks in the 1970s. While diﬀerent writers may emphasize diﬀerent aspects,
there is broad agreement that the crisis of the 1970s was the result of the
success of the Golden Age policies and institutions in generating high levels
of employment, rising real wages, and aspirations on the part of workers that
ultimately could not be satisﬁed within the limitations imposed by capitalist
social relations.
After 1980, the decline in the rate of proﬁt is arrested by two develop-
income tax on their dividends.
21See Mohun (2006) for an eﬀort to overcome these limitations.
22Another potential problem is that net interest includes a very large imputed compo-
nent, as the BEA, following neoclassical orthodoxy, assumes that corporations must be
paying their banks implicitly for the services they receive for having low-interest deposi-
tory accounts. This issue could potentially aﬀect how we regard the distribution of surplus
value between nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial institutions, but I have not found it to aﬀect the
calculations of proﬁtability in any substantive way.
17ments. First, the proﬁt share stabilizes and even increases over some sub-
periods, most notably the ﬁnal period leading up to the Great Recession.
Second, the decline in capital productivity continues sporadically until the
1990s when it is reversed decisively during the so-called New Economy. By
the broad measure (but not the narrow measure), capital productivity ap-
pears to recover its 1972 level, and the proﬁt share is larger than its 1972
level. As a result of these twin developments, the New Economy appears to
be charged by a positive technology shock that partially restores proﬁtability
to pre-1972 levels. Below we will see clear evidence that this did result in
the expected improvement in the rate of investment and accumulation in this
period. In the Marxian theory of accumulation, positive technology shocks
can do this, just as negative shocks can retard growth.
Signiﬁcantly, the expansion of the US economy after 2001 did not erase
these gains in proﬁtability, but it is perhaps signiﬁcant that the stability that
was achieved atypically combines a rise in the proﬁt share with a decline in
capital productivity. It is also possible that the expansion was cut oﬀ before
it achieved peak utilization and that this pattern will not survive future
data releases. That aside, one can speculate that this combination is less
favorable to expectations of future proﬁtability (in the sense elaborated in
the previous section) than, say, the positive technology shock that drove the
New Economy.
For example, in the Marglin-Bhaduri (1990) theory of investment that is
widely used by heterodox economists, capitalists respond to each determinant
of the rate of proﬁt separately. Capital productivity represents the maximum
limit to the rate of proﬁt, and if it is declining at the margin, that will have a
powerful eﬀect on expectations because as a ﬁrst approximation, capitalists
have little or no control over the evolution of technology. On the other
hand, a decline in the proﬁt share may not have such a powerful eﬀect on
expectations. While the capitalist class does have the ability to inﬂuence the
distribution of income, for example through its pricing policies, labor policies,
and by invoking the coercive powers of the state, an increase in the proﬁt
share can certainly be revoked by political and institutional forces. From
the vantage point of the corporate executives surveying their options during
the last decade, their net revenues may have been perceived to be weaker or
more tenuous than they appear in aggregate statistics.
To sum up, the Great Moderation can be understood as the political
response by the capitalist class to the underlying decline in proﬁtability ev-
ident in these data. Its main features are monetary restraint (see below);
18selective deregulation of ﬁnancial markets (ﬁnancialization), trade, and in-
ternational capital ﬂows (globalization); and social policies that reduce what
little power working people had achieved through New Deal policies and their
own self-organization. These features all share the implicit goal of restoring
proﬁtability by redistributing income toward capital, away from the working
class and the State. And we can see that to some extent these policies have
succeeded. Let us examine the two proﬁtability factors in more detail.
3.1 Capital productivity
As we discuss in detail below, the U.S. current account deﬁcit, driven by
massive trade deﬁcits with China, Japan, Germany, the GCC, etc. might be
expected to aﬀect the proﬁt rate data because of its devastating eﬀects on
the tradeable sector, chieﬂy manufacturing, during the last decade. Figure 1
breaks nonﬁnancial capital productivity down into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing, using some short-cuts made necessary by data availability,
especially the switch to the NAICS around 1998 in the NIPAs, which require
separating the sample after that date. Another important caveat here is that
the sectoral data on manufacturing value-added are based on establishment
records and thus are not adjusted for capital consumption allowances.
[Figures appear at end of paper.]
It has long been understood that the hypothesis that proﬁtability declines
under the secular inﬂuence of Marx-biased technical change applies with
greatest force to the manufacturing industries which rely very heavily on
innovations that substitute mechanical for manual and routine mental labor
(Michl, 1991). In general, capital productivity has declined steadily in the
manufacturing sector, which means that the stability in overall nonﬁnancial
corporate capital productivity visible during many periods in Table 1 results
from the counterweight provided by nonmanufacturing sectors that do not
display this bias. Interestingly, the rate of decline in manufacturing capital
productivity attenuates visibly over the Great Moderation, perhaps as the
consequence of the slower accumulation that has characterized this period.23
23Glyn (1997) ﬁnds this attenuation in the decline in manufacturing capital productivity
to be true for a broad range of advanced capitalist countries. I should add that the Federal
Reserve Board’s index of utilization in manufacturing deteriorates secularly, and using it to
adjust the capital productivity data would reveal periods of increasing productivity after
19Table 2: The Distribution of Net Domestic Business Sector Income,
1980-2007
Year 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-1999 2000-04 2005-07
Labor compensation 70.61 68.73 69.55 68.11 69.34 66.21
Total proﬁt 29.39 31.27 30.45 31.89 30.66 33.79
Nonﬁnancial proﬁt 26.55 28.36 27.37 27.76 25.74 28.71
Financial proﬁt 2.84 2.91 3.08 4.13 4.91 5.09
And, of course, the manufacturing sector (which remains around 97 per cent
incorporated throughout the period) has shrunk from roughly one half to
less than one quarter of nonﬁnancial corporate value added since 1960 so its
inﬂuence over the aggregate has diminished with time.
What makes the pattern evident in Figure 1 remarkable is that the decline
in capital productivity during the last decade has been driven by activities
outside the manufacturing sector (e.g., retail/wholesale trade). The manu-
facturing sector, despite experiencing stagnant or declining output and ac-
cumulation, (which might be expected to lower the measured output-capital
ratio in the short run), has shown stable or improving capital productiv-
ity.24 Since much of the dynamism of the New Economy was concentrated
in retail/wholesale trade (e.g., the rise of big box stores and Wal-Mart style
distribution systems), this decline could play a signiﬁcant role in shaping the
contours of accumulation in this critical period, as we discuss below.
3.2 Distribution
In order to provide more insight into the distributional shifts over the Great
Moderation, Table 2 breaks down net domestic business sector income into
wages and proﬁts, and further decomposes proﬁt-type income (net operating
surplus) into nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial sector proﬁt. This broader aggregate
1980. It would not, however, wipe out the evident secular decline before then. I have not
adjusted the data in the ﬁgure since no utilization indices exist outside of manufacturing.
24I also calculated capital productivity using gross value added originating by industry
divided by the net capital stock. The major substantive diﬀerence is that manufacturing
capital productivity does not increase by this measure over 2000-2007, as it does using
the national income data. In principle, gross value added divided by the capital stock
measures the sum of net capital productivity and the depreciation rate, which has been
increasing along with the rising share of equipment in capital stocks.
20makes it clear that the corporate sector (where more than two-thirds of pri-
vate sector GDP originates) has certainly not been unrepresentative. There
is an unmistakable decline in the share of wages, but as in the corporate
sector, this decline accelerates during the post 2001 cycle. It is also clear
that the ﬁnancial sectors have been disproportionately represented in the
general shift toward proﬁt-type income. And again, this pattern accelerates
in the post-2001 cycle. Whatever is driving “ﬁnancialization,” as this shift is
sometimes described, it is clear that high interest rates are neither necessary
nor suﬃcient.
Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear that the Great Recession of the Naugh-
ties does not represent a repeat of the proﬁtability crisis of the 1970s. As
the memo item in Table 1 shows, the overall corporate proﬁt rate (which
includes ﬁnancial corporations as discussed above) actually increases over
its previous peak in the 1990s. The proﬁt rate by any measure appears to
be strong, raising the question why the underlying rate of accumulation has
not been equally robust.
4 Accumulation and internal balance
In a basic classical growth model (Michl, 2009), accumulation reﬂects the
behavior of the capitalist agents who save and invest a constant proportion
of their wealth. In one of the most important advances in macroeconomics
in the twentieth century, Luigi Pasinetti discovered that even if workers and
the government are signiﬁcant sources of saving (or dissaving) used to ﬁnance
accumulation, the saving and investment propensity of the capitalist agents
governs the long run relationship between the rate of proﬁt and the rate of
accumulation. Pasinetti calls this the Cambridge Theorem. The classical
growth model describes the long run at a high level of abstraction where sav-
ing and investment become indistinct. The relationship between the classical
long run and the Keynesian short run (where coordination between saving
and investment is the central issue) remains theoretically unresolved.25
25There are three basic resolutions of this problem. First, some models essentially take
capitalist saving to be the “primitive” and make investment adjust according to some
ﬁnancial or monetary principle so that the system achieves long run growth at full or
normal capacity utilization; Dum´ enil and L´ evy (1999) or my own work (Michl, 2008) are
examples. Second some models take investment (determined by proﬁtability) to be primi-
tive, and make the saving rate adjust, again achieving full capacity utilization; Rowthorn
(1999) and Shaikh (2009) are examples. Third, some models regard the saving/investment
214.1 Declining investment
It follows from the Cambridge Theorem that we can gain insight into the
eﬀects of movements in proﬁtability by studying their eﬀects on the invest-
ment rate, i.e., the share of investment spending in total spending on ﬁnal
goods and services. This ratio of net investment to net value added will be
positively related to the capitalists’ propensity to save and invest, as well
as to the two factors that govern proﬁtability, the proﬁt share and capital
productivity.26 Figure 2 shows this ratio for the net investment attributed to
the aggregated business sector (nonﬁnancial corporate, nonﬁnancial noncor-
porate business, and ﬁnancial business). The investment rate does reﬂect the
broad pattern of proﬁtability we saw in Table 1. The proﬁtability crisis of
the 1970s shows up in the sharp declines in investment during the recessions
of 1973-75 and 1981-82, although there is a brief seemingly anomalous peak
in 1979 that probably reﬂects the easy credit immediately before Volker’s
volte face in Fed policy (see below). The Great Moderation begins life with
investment at historically low levels relative to the Golden Age, consistent
with the low proﬁtability discussed above. Finally, during the New Econ-
omy of the 1990s investment responds visibly to the improvements in capital
productivity and proﬁtability. But it is clear that this vitality could not be
sustained in the post 2001 recovery, and in fact, the peak in 2006 is the lowest
investment share among all peak years in the ﬁgure. We will return to this
important issue below.
There is a distinct visual impression of secular decline in the investment
share in Figure 2, interrupted by the New Economy. From the vantage point
of the classical growth model, this could in principle reﬂect a decline in the
propensity to save and invest, or it could reﬂect a decline in the compo-
nents of proﬁtability. Thus, if we are willing to believe that the underlying
propensity to save and invest is structurally invariant over time, the down-
distinction itself as primitive, and allow utilization to adjust through changing norms of
desired utilization; Lavoie (1995) and Dutt (1997) are examples. The working assumption
in this paper is that one or both of the ﬁrst two types are closer to the truth.
26To formalize these points, consider the Cambridge equation representing capitalist
saving out of end-of-period wealth, (1 + g) = β(1 + r), where g and β represent the rate
of accumulation and the propensity to save and invest out of wealth. The ratio of net
investment to value added (I/Y ) is equal to g/ρ, so that by dividing both sides by net
capital productivity, ρ, we can see that I/Y = βπ − (1 − β)/ρ. A decline in capital
productivity thus depresses the investment share, as does a decline in the proﬁt share or
(obviously) a decline in the propensity to save/invest out of wealth.
22ward shift evident in Figure 2 would represent independent corroboration of
the hypothesis that declining proﬁtability has persistently conditioned cap-
ital accumulation over the Great Moderation. But it could also represent a
structural shift in the propensity to save and invest, perhaps the result of
speciﬁc features of neoliberalism and ﬁnancialization.
There has been some discussion in the literature on ﬁnancialization about
a close cousin of the investment rate, namely the ratio of investment to
proﬁts. Stockhammer (2005-6) views the evident decline in this ratio as
a puzzle. If capitalists save and invest a constant fraction of their proﬁt
income (a ﬂow) rather than their end-of-period wealth (a stock), the share of
investment in value added will depend only on the saving rate and the proﬁt
share, and it will be invariant to changes in capital productivity. In this case,
Stockhammer’s puzzle implies that there must have been a structural shift in
the capitalist investment propensity during the Great Moderation (since we
can be fairly conﬁdent that the proﬁt share has not declined in this period).27
Yet from the classical growth perspective, the investment-proﬁt ratio can
merely reﬂect the underlying proﬁtability of investment if capitalist agents
save and invest a constant fraction of their wealth.28 If capitalist agents
maintain a stable relationship between their consumption and their wealth
stocks, in other words, the ﬁnancialization of corporate behavior, expressed
in growing tendencies of business enterprises to pay-out dividends, buy back
stock, and devote a smaller fraction of cash ﬂow to investment spending, all
reﬂect the natural response of corporate managers to the demands of their
owners. Despite the high level of abstraction required by the classical growth
model, it provides a parsimonious explanation of these phenomena. However,
it cannot in itself resolve the question of whether this decline in investment
spending, normalized by income or capital, represents a structural shift or a
response to declining proﬁtability.
This is easy to check by implementing the Cambridge equation linking
the rate of accumulation, g, to the rate of proﬁt, r, through the propensity
to save and invest out of end-of-period wealth, β. To get maximum coverage
and consistency, we use the narrow deﬁnition of capital to deﬁne both rates,
concentrating on the nonﬁnancial corporate sector. Since annual data don’t
convey much information about long-term structural relationships, we work
27In other words, using the traditional version of the Cambridge equation, g = sr, with
a propensity to save and invest out of proﬁt income, s, the investment share will satisfy
I/Y = sπ, and the ratio of investment to proﬁts will satisfy I/πY = s.
28Formally, the ratio of investment to proﬁt satisﬁes I/πY = β − (1 − β)/r.
23at a low frequency of 15 years (a short generational period), measuring rates
of proﬁt and growth at that frequency and then annualizing the data.29
For convenience, the table below shows growth factors, e.g., (1+g), where
g is in decimal form. I have also included the most recent (incomplete)
generational period, and broken out the Run-Up period as a memo item.
Here are the numbers:
1950-65 1965-80 1980-95 1995-2007 2000-07
1+g 1.031 1.040 1.022 1.025 1.019
1+r 1.132 1.119 1.097 1.105 1.098
β 0.911 0.930 0.932 0.930 0.928
The implicit saving/investment propensity out of capitalist wealth turns
out to be remarkably stable.30 There has been some deterioration from the
early to the later parts of the Great Moderation, and that may turn out to be
signiﬁcant despite the modest numbers involved. But the Great Moderation
period as a whole does not suggest a dramatic change from the 1950-1980
period taken as a whole. The real puzzle, it seems to me, is the high frequency
behavior of investment (which period averages suppress) during the last cycle
leading up to the Great Recession.
4.2 Disproportionality and residential investment
The share of household net investment in value added has also been in-
cluded in Figure 2. Household net investment comprises residential housing,
home improvements, and some construction by nonproﬁt institutions serving
households (such as colleges and universities). As a share of net product,
it behaves diﬀerently from business investment in important ways. In par-
ticular, it is clear that in the post-2001 recovery period, it was residential
29The Cambridge equation is described in a previous footnote. Growth rates are calcu-
lated using a discrete growth equation, and the annualized growth factor, (1 + g) over T
periods is just the geometric mean of the annual growth factors, K+1/K, or alternatively
T p
KT/K0.
30But notice that this whole discussion has assumed a one-commodity world in which
the relative price of capital goods is unity. The secularly declining price of capital goods,
particularly information technology, has played a mediating role in the real multicommod-
ity world. With declining relative prices, a given nominal ﬂow of investment translates
into a larger volume of capital goods as measured by the chain-type indexes used in the
NIPA for real capital stocks.
24Table 3: Real Interest Rates and Rates of Accumulation, 1960-2007
Real interest rates (% per year)
1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07
3-month Treasury 2.12 -0.18 2.65 1.61 0.50
10-year Treasury 2.79 1.00 4.39 3.40 2.01
Aaa Corporate 3.13 1.73 5.14 4.45 3.41
30-Year Mortgage 4.23 2.30 5.58 4.71 3.74
Rates of accumulation (% per year)
Nonﬁnancial corporate 4.06 3.65 2.49 3.10 1.87
Manufacturing 4.67 3.77 1.63 2.35 -0.35
Nonmanufacturing# 3.83 3.61 2.80 3.35 2.50
Housing 3.39 3.26 2.63 2.69 3.03
Notes: #Calculated using a Tornquist index. Let x, y, and z represent the real capital
stocks for corporate, manufacturing corporate, and nonmanufacturing. The index obeys
gx = θgy+(1−θ)gz where the nominal shares are additive, pxx = pyy+pzz, and θ = py/pxx
is the nominal share of manufacturing capital in corporate capital.
Growth rates of capital stocks are calculated annually using gx = xt+1/xt − 1, and then
averaged over the time intervals shown using a geometric average.
investment that did the heavy lifting. In the run-up to the Great Recession,
residential construction visibly drove aggregate demand.
That is why it makes some sense to view the Great Recession as a crisis
of disproportionality. Moreover, the homebuilding industry has evolved from
one organized around private contractors into one based on fully capitalist
production. As Mark Zandi observes, “From a fragmented collection of small,
privately held and essentially local builders, each putting up a few dozen
homes a year, the industry had transformed itself, becoming dominated by a
dozen publicly traded national ﬁrms that built thousands of homes annually.
In 1990, fewer than one in ten U.S. homes was build by a publicly held ﬁrm;
by 2005, the proportion was nearly one in three”(Zandi, 2009, p. 131).
To get some additional insight into the policy environment behind the
emergence of this disproportionality, Table 3 presents data on selected inﬂation-
adjusted interest rates, rates of capital accumulation, and rates of growth of
25the housing stock. The striking fact about the short-term interest rate that
most closely corresponds to the Fed policy rate (the fed funds rate) is that
after the 1970s, interest rates have been kept consistently high throughout
the Great Moderation period. Even during the New Economy period when
policy turned heavily toward ﬁscal surpluses (see below), rates are higher
than Golden Age levels by and large. The one exception, the short-term rate
closest to the OPR, is probably misleading because averaged over the decade,
it appears low owing to the exceptional eﬀorts required by the Fed to over-
come the ﬁrst jobless recovery after the 1991 recession (post-2001 was the
second jobless recovery). If we look at peak levels at the end of the business
cycle, inﬂation-adjusted short rates were higher in 2000 than at any point
during the Golden Age (1953-69).
If the 1970s proﬁtability crisis was triggered by the overaccumulation of
capital in relation to available supplies of labor and raw materials, then this
policy stance makes sense as a way of managing the accumulation process
in the interests of capital. Of course, the oﬃcial ideology31 provided in part
by the economics profession itself through its doctrine of the natural rate of
unemployment has been that the Fed learned to follow a Taylor Rule that
respects the inﬂation barrier. In practice this has meant a policy of restrained
accumulation that prevented the unemployment rate from falling to levels
that once again threatened proﬁt margins and mark-ups.32 Despite some
signs of life in the New Economy, accumulation rates for the nonﬁnancial
and manufacturing sectors remain lower than even the 1970s, and certainly
have not recovered the levels of the Golden Age of Accumulation before then.
The Naughties, however, represent an exception. Interest rates were kept
unusually low during the recovery after 2001. The eponymous John Taylor
(2009) argues that this was the policy error that led directly to the Great
Recession via its eﬀects on housing, oil prices, and ﬁnancial markets. But
he does not ask what motivated the Fed’s abrupt departure from the Taylor
Rule, after allegedly achieving two decades of stable growth during the Great
Moderation. Part of the answer lies in the remainder of Table 3 where we
can see that despite historically strong proﬁtability, nonﬁnancial corporate
accumulation barely responded to the stimulus of low interest rates. Par-
31Romer and Romer (2002) present the conventional view of the evolution of monetary
policy.
32This policy stance is even more pronounced in Europe, where following the Bundes-
bank, high interest rates arguably drove the “natural” rates of unemployment up through
hysteresis-type eﬀects. See Ball (1999).
26ticularly striking is the manufacturing sub-sector (which is almost totally
incorporated), where capital decumulation and absolute deindustrialization
prevail.33 In retrospect, it seems clear that the Fed was desperately trying to
generate enough growth so that employment would escape the jobless recov-
ery that followed the 2001 recession. Indeed, with the scent of Japan’s Lost
Decade hanging freshly in the air, the FOMC in this period explicitly sought
to avoid an impending deﬂation trap. But the usual response from business
investment was not going to work in the expected way, and the stimulus
gained traction only, as we see in the ﬁnal row of Table 3, in the residential
housing industry, which has always been an interest-sensitive sector in the
U.S.
In sum, the decade preceding the Great Recession of the Naughties presents
us with the puzzle that despite the dual stimulus of relatively strong ex post
proﬁtability and low real interest rates, the investment response from the
business sector has been historically weak, even anemic.34There is some sug-
gestion from capital productivity, particularly outside of the manufacturing
sector, that prospective yields on new capital projects might not be encourag-
ing to capital formation, but as with all recent data, this needs to be handled
with care. Without sustained high capital productivity, the proﬁtability of
existing projects has been elevated entirely by the redistribution of income
from labor toward capital, in particular toward ﬁnance capital, distinctive
features of the Great Moderation that accelerated ﬁercely during the last
decade.
33In fact, manufacturing output growth is also negative or historically low in this period,
mirroring the collapse of investment. This represents a structural break from the historical
pattern of relative deindustrialization driven by the relatively high rates of technical change
in manufacturing. See Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2008).
34Some may argue that interest rates have little eﬀect on investment even under ordinary
circumstances based on the much-discussed insensitivity that a large empirical literature
has established, so that we should not expect low rates to stimulate much investment
spending. But the interest sensitivity of business investment is rarely found to be zero. It
is important to realize that “insensitivity” is often deﬁned in terms of the expectations of
neoclassical theory under near-Cobb-Douglas technology, which, as Chirinko et al. (2004)
explain, predicts a fairly large elasticity.
275 Accumulation and external imbalance
The previous section speculates that one potential source of investment in-
sensitivity to interest rates could have been the negative technology shock
from declining capital productivity in the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector, but
this hardly seems adequate to explain the misshapen contour of accumulation
in this critical pre-crisis period.
To get closer to the action, consider Figure 3, a canonical Godley chart
that shows the sectoral ﬁnancial balances (saving minus investment) ex-
pressed as a percent of GDP for scaling purposes.35 Since we are considering
all domestic sectors (households, government, business) and the rest of the
world, the national accounting identity between saving and investment re-
quires that these series should sum to zero in each year (ignoring the small
statistical discrepancies). The Godley chart elegantly displays the structure
of lending and borrowing, broadly conceived, since a sector in surplus must
be acquiring the liabilities of the sectors in deﬁcit.
The patterns could not be more clear. First, households, which tradition-
ally have been a source of funding for corporations and government, have
slipped into the deﬁcit region. This is the ﬁnancial counterpart to the hous-
ing boom visible in the accumulation rates in Table 3 or Figure 2. Second,
the current account has fallen into a progressively deeper deﬁcit, represented
here by the countervailing inﬂow of capital from the rest of the world. Third,
the government sector’s surplus position under Clinton has also ﬂipped, due
to Bush II’s enthusiasm for ﬁscal deﬁcits.36
Finally, the business sector, traditionally a net borrower to ﬁnance ac-
cumulation, has ﬂipped over to join the rest of the world in lending to the
household and government sectors during the run-up to the Great Recession.
The net saving of this sector is mainly the diﬀerence between the retained
earnings (operating surplus minus net interest, dividends, and business taxes)
of corporations or quasi-corporations and their net ﬁxed investment.37 Thus
35Wynne Godley generally adopts a sign convention that makes upward movements in
a variable indicate a demand stimulus, which I ﬁnd confusing, and I stick to the true signs
in the national accounting identity.
36Godley’s (1999) prediction that this ﬁscal stance was virtually inescapable was, of
course, one of the most spectacular I-told-you-so stories in recent memory.
37A quasi-corporation is a business enterprise that covers operating costs through sales
and keep complete ﬁnancial records. In the integrated SNA-NIPA national accounts, net
ﬁxed investment includes adjusted changes in inventories (which must be ﬁnanced) and
purchases of nonproduced assets like drilling rights, land, or electromagnetic spectrum.
28the high levels of net business saving could in principle reﬂect, for exam-
ple, an increase in the rate of retention of corporate proﬁts. Yet, as noted
above, corporations have been distributing a progressively higher share of
their proﬁts (after payment of taxes and net interest) to stockholders. Here
are the ﬁgures on the percentage share of nonﬁnancial corporate proﬁts after
tax that are distributed as dividends:
1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07
39.36 45.37 49.57 61.67 77.25
Thus this remarkable structural break in business saving reﬂects the joint
eﬀect of the very high share of proﬁts and the very low level of investment
spending that we have already discussed. Evidently, despite unprecedented
dividend payout rates in the last decade, corporations are still left with sur-
plus funds to place on ﬁnancial markets where they can work their way
back to the household sector either indirectly via intermediaries or directly
through the loans, credits and stock buybacks that have become increasingly
prevalent over the Great Moderation.
If Figure 3 referred to a developing country, an open economy macroe-
conomist would see clear signs of impending disaster caused by an excessive
and destabilizing capital inﬂow and corresponding trade and current account
deﬁcit. In the 1990s, such episodes inﬂated domestic asset markets, drove
real estate and oﬃce construction booms, and ended in the Asian currency
crises of 1997. But the ﬁgure refers to the global hegemon that issues the
dollar liabilities used for reserves that fund international trade and ﬁnance.
The U.S. enjoys an “exorbitant privilege”: it stands at the apex of the Bret-
ton Woods II system, borrowing from oﬃcial sources in the Paciﬁc Rim who
have been eager to accumulate reserves for precautionary motives, and, in the
case of China, to sustain a spectacular example of export- and investment-led
growth.38 Not only that, the ﬁnancial sector has grown much faster than the
underlying domestic base of real productive activity and the inﬂow of capital
that is evident in Figure 3 represents a very proﬁtable business opportunity
for Wall Street ﬁnance companies. From Robert Rubin forward, U.S. Trea-
sury Secretaries of both parties have consistently favored the strong dollar
policies that sustain these ﬂows and direct business toward their clients and
38According the IMF World Economic Outlook (September 2005) China saves and in-
vests an estimated 45-50 per cent of its national income, which as far as I know is without
precedent.
29employers, particularly the big investment houses. Some economists, such as
Cooper (2008), making a virtue of necessity, even argue (at least they did be-
fore September 2008!) that this inﬂow of capital is a Good Thing for the U.S.
since it harnesses our comparative advantage in producing and marketing so-
phisticated ﬁnancial products. But the key point is that in a world economy
structured by the imperatives of globalization, such potentially destabilizing
capital ﬂows are integrally related to the policies of neoliberalism.
Is it any wonder that this conﬁguration has had such a punishing eﬀect
on the propensity of U.S. corporations to invest real resources in nonﬁnancial
sectors? The sharp collapse of manufacturing investment in particular signals
a reluctance of capitalists to take a chance that some Chinese upstart (or
perhaps a whole Chinese upstart city specializing in their product line) will
eat their lunch when any newly installed capacity comes on stream. In terms
of the Minskian liquidity trap, the China price could well be expected to raise
the level of uncertainty and increase the discount rate for any given level of
monetary interest rates.39
The “global savings glut” hypothesis advanced by Ben Bernanke and oth-
ers is true up to a point, in other words, but it is incomplete. For it is not
immediately obvious why an inﬂow of capital on such cheap terms would
not have stimulated a general increase in investment, instead of generating a
lopsided housing-led recovery after 2001.40 This point receives some support
from IMF staﬀ economists (International Monetary Fund, 2005, Ch. 2) who
ﬁnd that the dearth of investment spending, despite favorable monetary con-
ditions in the last decade, appears to be widespread among both advanced
and developing nations. We don’t have a savings glut so much as an invest-
ment shortage. Perhaps a big part of the answer is that the invasion of cheap
imports from China made investment in manufacturing unthinkable, and the
rest of the economy presents only so much capacity for capital growth in such
a short period.41
39I am indebted to Duncan Foley for this point. I have also been inﬂuenced by Blecker
(2007) who shows that the exchange rate signiﬁcantly (both in the statistical and substan-
tive senses) inﬂuences investment by manufacturing ﬁrms.
40Bernanke (2005) was aware of the weakness of U.S. investment when he advanced
this thesis, but attributed it to “cyclical and other” factors. His point that a surfeit of
global savings favored non-tradable sectors does not explain why among these, only the
residential housing sector seems to have ﬂourished.
41Note that if there had been an investment response to the inﬂow of foreign capital,
it too could have been accommodated by an increase in securitizations (which are used
to ﬁnance a wide range of business activities outside of real estate, including inventories,
30There is another important connection between the external imbalance
and performance during the post-2001 recovery. We have already seen evi-
dence that the distribution of income shifted strongly toward proﬁts during
this period. This shift may have in part been driven by the eﬀect of trade,
particularly on workers in the traded goods sectors, who experienced sharp
declines in their bargaining power. And while a low real wage increases
the potential rate of growth in the long run in the classical theory, it may
have signiﬁcant short-run eﬀects on aggregate demand under the “wage-led”
regimes described by Blecker (2002). Both of these conjectures help make
sense of the weak employment and output growth, as well as the disappoint-
ing investment performance, during this critical period.
In short, the external disproportionality plagueing the U.S. economy, its
current account deﬁcit driven by trade with the Paciﬁc Rim countries and
capital inﬂows from the BRICs, China, and Southeastern Asia, has a com-
plex organic relationship to the internal disproportionality represented in the
unsustainable reliance on residential construction during the run-up to the
Great Recession. But these two imbalances are in themselves incomplete, for
the rise of ﬁnance capital has transformed the intermediation process over
the Great Moderation. Without the ﬁnancial innovations that permit the
securitization of debt and other sources of cash ﬂow, it is hard to see how the
particular form the crisis assumed in its initial phases could have arisen, and
that story lies outside the self-imposed limits of this paper. Yet having an un-
derstanding of the underlying real contradictions that have developed during
the Great Moderation makes these ﬁnancial developments less mysterious.
The policy implications of this analysis place substantial weight for recov-
ery on correcting the external imbalances, chieﬂy through a real depreciation
of the dollar, and restoring the manufacturing and other tradeable sectors.
This is likely to be a focal point of policy debate, especially because it con-
ﬂicts with the “strong dollar” policy associated with Robert Rubin and now
accepted by the Treasury and the Fed.42 It seems very unlikely that on its
own domestic investment will provide the demand growth needed for a sus-
tained recovery toward anything like full employment. The neoliberal policy
regime that brought us the Great Moderation has exhausted itself.
receivables, leasing, and auto loans). If the underlying investments were proﬁtable, how-
ever, this would not have triggered the ﬁnancial debacle caused by a securitized real estate
bubble.
42At least by its Chairman, Ben Bernanke, based on public statements he made in his
appearance on the July 2009 PBS News Hour.
316 Conclusion
We have seen that from a Minskian perspective, the best way to think about
a liquidity trap is to focus on the investment decision, rather than on the
zero interest bound. A Minskian liquidity trap is a pathology of accumula-
tion in which new capital assets are judged less valuable than their market
price owing to one (or more) of three factors. First, as Keynes was already
aware, when the underlying rate of proﬁt that capitalists experience falls be-
low some critical threshold, the conditions for a liquidity trap ripen. Both
direct and indirect signs point to declining proﬁtability as central to the col-
lapse of the Golden Age of Accumulation, and to some features of the Great
Moderation, but the rate of proﬁt has been partially restored over the last
decades through neoliberal policies. Second, it is not only the ex post proﬁt
rate but expectations of future proﬁtability that regulate the investment de-
cision. Here we can only speculate that despite the surface appearance of
health in the proﬁt data over the last two cycles, the underlying reality per-
ceived by corporate managers and owners has grown less favorable owing to
the inherently tenuous nature of the distributional shift from labor income
toward proﬁts and interest upon which the appearance is based. And third,
the uncertainty about the future can ratchet up the discounting of any given
stream of prospective yields, and the U.S. economy’s growing addiction to
imported capital and goods cannot have improved the sense of security cap-
italist decision makers hold about the likelihood that their business ventures
will pan out in the face of newly rising centers of production, particularly
in China. These three factors were already at work, creating multiple dis-
proportionalities and a heightened vulnerability to ﬁnancial shocks within
the U.S. economy well before visible signs of the Great Recession began to
appear in the summer and fall of 2007.
32Data sources
Table 1. The main source is the integrated SNA-NIPA national account
available at www.bea.gov. Table S.5 covers the nonﬁnancial corporate
sector. For the overall corporate sector, data from the traditional BEA
NIPAs, Table 1.14, and the Fixed Capital Stock data, Table 6.1, were
used.
Table 3. Interest rates and inﬂation rates (measured by the CPI-U)
were taken from the Economic Report of the President, Tables B-73
and B-64. Rates of accumulation are from the BEA Fixed Capital
Stocks data, Table 6.2, and, for housing, Table 5.2.
Table 2. Data are from the integrated SNA-NIPA accounts (see above),
Table S.2. The business sector combines nonﬁnancial noncorporate,
nonﬁnancial corporate, and ﬁnancial sectors.
Figure 1. Data for national income (without capital consumption ad-
justment) for manufacturing come from NIPA Table 6.1B (SIC basis)
and 6.1D (NAICS basis). For the nonﬁnancial corporate sector, data
come from NIPA Table 1.14. For comparability, the capital consump-
tion adjustment is removed from nonﬁnancial corporate national in-
come.
Figure 2. Data for business net investment, household net investment
and net domestic product are from the integrated SNA-NIPA accounts,
Table S.2.
Figure 3. Data for sectoral ﬁnancial balances are all from the integrated
SNA-NIPA accounts, Table S.2. The business sector is deﬁned as above.
In-text tables. Data on the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve Banks
comes from the Fed’s H.1. press release, which can be found, along with
the data used in the text on the assets of large bank holding companies,
at www.federalreserve.gov. Data for the proﬁt rate are from the same
source as Table 1. Data for accumulation are from the same source
as Table 3. Data for the retention ratio are from the same source as
Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Capital productivity in the nonﬁnancial corporate sector, using national income
without capital consumption adjustments. Left panel: 1950-2000, SIC basis. Right panel:
1998-2007, NAICS basis. Note change of scale.
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Figure 2: Business sector net investment and household sector net investment (mostly














Figure 3: Net ﬁnancial balances (saving minus investment) for the major sectors, ex-
pressed as percent of gross domestic product.
40